Reducing the legacy debts of the credit bubble

The information provided in the annual accounts of the banks allows us to observe developments in the remaining stock of debt from the loans that were issued during the credit bubble.  For example, here are Bank of Ireland’s mortgages (PDH and BTL) by year of origination with the data going back to 2011, the first year such information was provided.

Between the end of 2011 and the end of 2018 BOI’s stock of mortgages decreased by 15 per cent – from €27.9 billion to €23.7 billion.  However, this headline figure masks what is happening within the loan book and new loans issued each year replace those which are repaid.  The reduction in loans originating in 2011 or earlier is much greater.

At the end of 2011, BOI had €20.0 billion of mortgages that originated between 2004 and 2008, the peak years of the credit bubble.  By the end of 2018, the amount of mortgages issued in that five-year period had reduced to €11.1 billion.  This is a reduction of €9 billion or 45 per cent over the seven years. 

And that is only since 2011.  If the figures were available for earlier years they would show that well over half of the mortgage debt issued by BOI between 2004 and 2008 no longer exists.

Of course, this may overstate the reduction in debt for individual households as many may have remortgaged because, for example, they moved house.  At the end 2011, BOI had 115,000 mortgage accounts that were issued between 2004 and 2008. By the end of 2018 this number had fallen to 85,500.

We can use the number of accounts to get an average outstanding balance for each year.

This shows that from the end of 2011 to the end of 2018, the average balance on the remaining mortgages issued between 2004 and 2008 fell by between 24 and 30 per cent.  This is not a like-for-like comparison each year as the average is calculated using only the number of mortgages which remain on the bank's balance sheet; mortgages which are repaid in full or replaced due to remortgages are not included. 

The figures above, though, probably give a good indication of what is happened to mortgages that are being reduced with regular monthly repayments.  For example, at the end of 2011, the 24,000 mortgages BOI has which it had issued in 2007 had an average balance of just over €200,000.  By the end of 2018, the number of these mortgages had fallen to 19,000 and the average balance of those remaining was €148,000 – a reduction of 26 per cent (and that is since the end of 2011 not the point of origination).

Whichever way we look at it – remaining stock or average balance – it can be seen that the legacy debts of the credit bubble have been significantly reduced.  They will have a long tail but, for BOI mortgages at least, we are probably passed the half life.

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Do we need another SSIA scheme?

IBEC have joined a number of recent calls for the introduction of an SSIA-type scheme for Irish households.  The various proposals are usually accompanied by claims that such a scheme should be counter-cyclical and can help prevent the economy “overheating”.  Given that the previous scheme ran from May 2001 to April 2007 corresponded to the build up of unsustainable levels of economic activity it may be hard to find support for such claims.  And it may be that such a scheme simply ends up being a transfer to those who can save.

To assess the impact, if any, of the previous SSIA scheme and whether we need one now let’s look at some outcomes for the household sector.  First, the gross savings rate.  This is essentially the share of gross disposable income that is not used for consumption (i.e. current expenditure).

This offers some support for the thesis that such schemes can take money out of the economy.  The gross savings rate rose from around six per cent in 2001/02 to around ten per cent by 2005.  But then the savings fell in 2006/07 when overheating pressures reached their peak.  It is possible that the timing of contributions and maturities of the SSIAs played a role in these outcomes.

It is also worth noting that even without an SSIA-type scheme we have seen a significant rise in the gross savings rate in recent years.  During 2018, the savings rate averaged almost 12 per cent.  This compares to an average of around eight percent for the period 2003 to 2006.  And here is where we stand relative to most of the EU15 (Greece and Luxembourg are excluded):

Ireland’s current gross savings rate is pretty much in the middle.  It is not clear that it needs to be higher.  And do we need to incentivise something that is already happening?

Of course, the current account only gives a partial impact of a sectors impact on the economy – we need to look at the capital account as well.  The bottom line for a sector is the amount of net lending/borrowing it does.  This is the final outcome after all earnings, taxes, transfers and spending have been accounted for by adding capital flows to the current flows that are used to get the savings rate.  And it is on the bottom line that we see where the action was:

The 2001 to 2007 SSIA scheme might have been taking some money out in the current account but once we add in what was happening in the capital account we can see that the household sector was a net borrower and that this increased during the period.  It is very likely that some of the income that was considered “saving” in the current account only arose because of the significant borrowing shown above in the capital account. 

In 2001, for every €100 of disposable income that the household sector had it, had total spending (current plus capital) of around €110. By 2006, household spending was more than €120 for every €100 of income (with some of this fueled by maturing SSIAs).  The borrowing came to a shuddering halt in 2008 and for the past decade total spending has been around €95 for every €100 of income.  The Irish household sector has been a net lender and, in aggregate terms, this has averaged around €5 billion a year for the past decade or so.

This impact of this borrowing and lending can clearly be seen in the household sector balance sheet:

There was a huge run-up in household sector loan liabilities up to 2008, reaching a peak of €204 billion.  Since then, the net lending has led to deleveraging with a loan liabilities reducing to €138 billion by the third quarter of 2018.  At the same time, household deposits have been increasing and during 2018 actually exceeded household loans for the first time since 2002. 

It has been a remarkable improvement in the aggregate balance sheet of the Irish household sector.  That this deleveraging, which ought to have been a drag on growth, coincided with a resurgent economy is even more remarkable.

And here is Ireland’s household sector net lending/borrowing relative to the rest of the EU15 (with only Luxembourg excluded in this instance).

As of 2018, the Irish household sector has the third highest net lending rate in the EU15.  Maybe we could look for a change in the composition of that lending.  This could happen as the debts of the credit bubble are paid off and households may switch to something like increased pension saving.

But, it is doubtful that it needs to be higher.  It might be that, given the risks we face, that we need other sectors to be doing a bit of saving (the government sector maybe); after a decade of deleveraging the household sector can probably afford to cut loose a bit. 

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Why the “working poor” makes for an inappropriate policy target

The publication by the CSO of the results from the Survey on Income and Living Conditions (SILC) always generates plenty of reaction.  One focus following the release of the 2017 results has been the “working poor” such as the headline of this piece.

The CSO provide income and poverty rates by principle economic status and the 2017 outcomes are summarised here:

As can be seen for the “at work” category the at-risk-of-poverty rate (equivalised disposable income below 60 per cent of the national median) is given as 5.4 per cent.  When we add in measures of deprivation, we find that 1.4 per cent of those with a principle economic status of “at work” live in households deemed to be in consistent poverty.  Given how low these levels are relative to other categories, the “at work” group seem a peculiar group to focus on.

Here we provide five reasons why targeting the at-work at-risk-of-poverty rate may be inappropriate.

1. Ireland already has the second-lowest AROP rate for employees in the EU15.
2. The measure is as much a function of household type, especially the presence of children, as it is labour market outcomes.
3. When it comes to labour market outcomes the most important factor is the amount of work with low AROP rates for households with high or very-high levels of work intensity.
4. The link between low pay at the level of the individual and low income at the level of the household is weak.
5. One-third of the “working poor” are self-employed who are excluded from most policy proposals.

1 Comparison across the EU15

Eurostat provide figures that allow us to compare the at-risk-of-poverty rates across the EU for people who are employed and one feature of this is how well Ireland does.  Here are the AROP rate for employees since 2009:

The 2017 figure for Ireland has not been provided to Eurostat yet but it seems likely that Ireland will have close to the second-lowest in-work at-risk-of-poverty rate for employees in the EU15.

2 The role of household type

The determination of whether of being at-risk-of-poverty is based on equivalised household income rather than than earnings of the employee on their own.  For example, you could have two employees both earning €30,000 – one could be deemed to be at-risk-of-poverty and one may not. How can that be if there are both earning the same amount? Type of households or, more particularly, children. 

If there are more people in the household then the available income has to be spread over more people thus reducing the equivalised, or per (weighted) person, income of the household. 

Here are the figures from Eurostat for the at-risk-of-poverty rates for people at work but living in two different types of households in Ireland:

• Household with two or more adults with dependent children
• Households with two or more adults without dependent children

It can be seen that, bar the peak crisis years of 2009 to 2011, the at-risk-of-poverty rates of workers in the households with children is about twice that of households without children.  It is not the labour market that drives in-work at-risk-of-poverty rates; it is household type.

3 The amount of work

This amount of work can be measured by household work-intensity: the amount of available time that someone is working.  If the working-age adults in a household have a high or very-high work intensity there is close to no chance of that household being at-risk-of poverty.

In-work, at-risk-of poverty rates are highest for those households with low work intensity.  These are households where members of working age worked between 20 per cent and 45 per cent of their total potential during the previous 12 months.  Households composed only of children, of students aged less then 25 and/or people aged 60 or more are completely excluded from the work-intensity indicator calculation.

Again, relative to the rest of the EU15, Irish households with low work intensity have at-risk-of-poverty rates well below those of other countries.

Over 60 per cent of Irish households who are classed as in-work and at-risk-of-poverty have either low or medium levels of work intensity.  It is not earnings that drives the in-work, at-risk-of-poverty rates; it is the amount of work.

Something, such as a refundable tax credit may have very little impact on at-risk-of-poverty households with children.  The at-risk-of-poverty threshold for a 2 adult plus 2 children household in 2017 was €29,000.  Even allowing for Child Benefit such a household close to that threshold which gets its income from work will have used almost all the available tax credits.  Making them refundable will make little difference to them.

The majority of households who are deemed be in-work and at-risk-of-poverty have low or medium work intensity.  Refundable tax credits in this instance would be a reflection of a low amount of work rather than low earnings.

4 Low pay and household income

The link between low pay and at-risk-of-poverty rates is weak.  Ireland has workers who are low paid but they are not in low-income households.

The chart would suggest that something around six per cent of low-pay employees (below a threshold of €12.20 a hour in the analysis shown) are in households who are at-risk-of-poverty. Or, in other words, 94 per cent of low-pay employees are in households who are not at-risk-of-poverty.  Indeed, over half of low-pay employees are in households in the top half of the income distribution.  There are almost as many low-pay employees in households in the top decile as there are in the bottom decile.

Policies, such as refundable tax credits, that target the low paid seem likely to make overall inequality and at-risk-of-poverty rates worse as very little of the benefit would accrue to those at the bottom of the income distribution.  It is likely that part-time second earners would appreciate it but in most cases these already come from middle- to high-income households.

It is also not clear how a refundable tax credit would work in the case of the self-employed. It was noted at the press briefing for the SILC publication that around one-third of those deemed to be in-work and at-risk-of-poverty are self-employed. Refundable personal and PAYE tax credits would mean that one-third of the target group is excluded. And a large share of the resources used would go to people outside the target group – the low-paid in high-income households.

Saying that the “working poor” should not be a policy target doesn’t mean we shouldn’t have policies that try to increase incomes. We should. But using the in-work at-risk-of-poverty rate as a benchmark for either the justification of certain policies or in judging the success of polices may not be appropriate.

We conclude with a comparison we have made before:

For all levels of household work intensity Ireland has at-risk-of-poverty rates that are lower than Sweden’s, and significantly so in some cases, e.g. medium and low. Yet, the overall at-risk-of-poverty rates of the countries are very similar.

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Corporation Tax and the Balance of Payments

A previous post looked at how the current account of the balance of payments can be an early-warning indicator of an economy “living beyond its means”.  This is particularly so if the unsustainable income arises via credit expansion.  The post concluded, though, by saying that a red flag might not always go up for the balance of payments if the unsustainable income flows through it.

Getting a handle on Ireland’s underlying balance of payments position isn’t straightforward.  The CSO have published a modified current account that attempts to strip out many of the distortions, mainly from MNCs, that pollute the headline position. 

For our purposes here we are interested in the end result rather than the modifications made.  The most recent version of the modified current account is available for the period 2007 to 2017 and here it is as a proportion of GNI*.

As we now now know there was a significant deterioration in the current account up to 2008.  Since then, like many economic indicators for Ireland, there has been a significant turnaround.

In the early years of the crisis one factor that contributed to the improvement in the current account was the reduction in imports.  We were spending a large amount of the unsustainable, credit-fueled income on imported goods.  There was a reason champagne was removed from the Consumer Price Index in 2011 (see Table 1.1).

In recent years, food exports have boosted the underlying position, most notably dairy products for the past two years or so.  On the income side, the amount of outbound interest on the government’s debt has been declining.

There is some level of uncertainty about all of these but concerns over volatility do not necessarily translate into concerns of sustainability.  One item affecting the current account that generate such concerns are Ireland’s surging Corporation Tax revenues.

And this is what we see if we put Ireland’s revenues in the context of the EU15.

It wouldn’t be usual to link tax revenues to the current account.  In general, tax revenues are raised from activities and entities in the domestic economy while the current account reflects the cross-border flow of trade, income and transfers.  But Ireland is unusual for the amount of Corporation Tax that comes from foreign-owned companies and unique for the amount that comes from foreign companies which are US-owned companies.

The following table gives the domestic company/foreign company split for the gross operating surplus generated in the business economies of the EU15.  Gross operating surplus (GOS) is a relatively useful proxy of the corporate income tax base but some caution is warranted because it is before the deduction of depreciation.  For this, and a few other reasons, we will use data from 2014 rather than a more recent year.

The foreign share in GOS is highest in Ireland (69.4 per cent).  Luxembourg is the only other country to have more than half of GOS generated by foreign-controlled companies.  The median for the EU15 is 24 per cent.

And it is for US companies that Ireland really stands out.  After Ireland’s highest share at 56.8 per cent, next is again Luxembourg but this time the gap is all the way to 14.7 per cent.  The median for the share of GOS generated by US-owned companies in the EU15 is 3.6 per cent.  It was only in the sentence before last but Ireland is 56.8 per cent (or at least was in 2014; it is likely higher now).

The issue is that the surge in Corporation Tax is coming through the current account. The current account looks fine.  The deficits built up in the previous boom have been eliminated and there have been underlying surpluses for the past few years.  This suggests we could increase our consumption and investment spending from within our existing resources.

However, we need to be mindful of the impact Corporation Tax from US MNCs has on how we measure those existing resources using the current account.  These receipts are somewhat of a transfer to Ireland that are boosting the current account – could we compare them to the EU receipts of the late 1980s and early 1990s?

Of course, we don’t know what will happen Corporation Tax revenues over the coming years and it is much better to be receiving €10 billion of Corporation Tax than not receiving it. Our point here is that looking for the current account to provide a red flag for “living beyond our means” - as the previous post did – may not be wholly appropriate.  The current account will only reflect any unsustainability in these Corporation Tax receipts when it is too late, i.e. when they are gone.  

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Does one-third of Income Tax and PRSI come from IDA client firms?

The IDA summary of their 2018 results includes the following:

IDA Ireland’s clients are also significant employers; with average salaries at €66,000 in 2017 they are consistently above national averages (€46,402). As a result foreign MNCs account for one third of total Income tax, USC and Employers PRSI paid in the state.

Does one-third of Income Tax, USC and PRSI come from IDA client firms? No.  Ireland’s national income is heavily influence by the contribution of foreign-owned MNCs but that does not extend to them being the source of one-third of income tax revenues.

According to the Revenue Commissioners net receipts in 2017 from Income Tax/USC and PRSI came to €28.7 billion in 2016 and €30.2 billion in 2017.  It is easy to see that the IDA claim is incorrect from this summary table.

The numbers are impressive but unless almost all the €11.7 billion of payroll from these companies in 2017 went to tax and PRSI there is no way they can contribute one-third from a total of €30.2 billion.

The footnotes to the table state that the IDA’s claim is “based on Revenue analysis of foreign owned multinational employer returns for 2016 of income tax, USC and employer PRSI excluding wholesale and retail trade.”  They are referring to this paper by McCarthy and McGuinness which includes the following figures:

We can see that payroll Income Tax, USC and Employer’s PRSI from foreign-owned MNCs came to €6.7 billion in 2016.  This is for all foreign-owned MNCs not just those who are IDA clients.  The IDA note that they exclude firms in the wholesale and retail trades (who won’t be their clients) but are probably still left with a figure that is around €5 billion (which is 45% of the payroll total for 2016 from the first table).

Now, this may be nearly one-third of the €16.7 billion shown for Income Tax, USC and PRSI shown in the table but this is only the amount that arises from companies.  It excludes the self-employed, the public sector and non-labour related sources of income taxes. 

IDA-client firms may be the source of one-third of a particular sub-set of income taxes but that is not what they have claimed. It looks like the answer may be around one-sixth (c.€5 billion out of €30 billion) which is, of itself, pretty significant and substantial.  But with 80 per cent of Corporation Tax coming from foreign-owned MNCs we have enough evidence of concentration risks without the need to be exaggerating their contribution to other tax headings.

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